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ARGUMENT
L

Introduction.

In its responsive brief, FA TCO makes several arguments, some which it raised
below and some which it did not. Others address the actual conclusions of the District COUli in
its decision below and some do not. BOI respectfully submits the following points in reply,
roughly in the sequential order presented in FA TCO' s brief, which demonstrate that none of the
arguments raised by FA TCO are persuasive. Accordingly, the District Court's decision should
be reversed as requested in BO r s opening brief.
2.

ContrarY to F ATCO's assertion, the "natural starting point" for

analysis in this case is not Section 7, it is instead the grant of coverage afforded to EOI by
Endorsement 116 to the Policv.
As a preliminary matter, FA TCO asserts that in determining whether it is liable to
BOL "the natural starting point" for analysis is Section 7 of the Loan Policy Conditions and
Stipulations. (Respondent's Brief: p. 7.) BOI respectfully disagrees, and submits that the
"natural starting point" for any analysis in this case is instead the relevant grant of coverage
afforded to BOI by the Policy at issue, Endorsement 116, which provides in pertinent part:
The Company hereby insures the owner of the indebtedness secured by the insured
mortgage against loss or damage ,vhich the insured shall sustain by reason of the
failure of (i) a MULTI FAMILY RESIDENCE (description of improvement e.g. "a
single family residence .') known as 1354 E 16 th Street, Idaho Falls, ID 83401 (street
address), to be located on the land at Date of Policy, or (ii) the map attached to this
policy to correctly show the location and dimensions of the land according to the public
records. (Emphasis added in part.)
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(R. Vol. 2, pp. 457.) This grant of coverage unambiguously and unequivocally "insures" Bor for
all "loss or damage" which it "shall sustain" because a "multi family residence" was not "located
on the land.
In the midst of heated arguments about the meaning and effect of one fine print
provision of the Policy or another, it is easy to overlook the central importance of this simple,
broad grant of coverage. It differs markedly from the more traditional coverage usually afforded
by title insurance. While common, "garden variety" title insurance typically insures only against
title defects or other issues related to the title to property, Endorsement 116 insures the actual
physical condition of the land, i.e., whether a building is in fact physically located on the
property. Thus in one sense, the coverage at issue in this case is more akin to property insurance,
rather than traditional title insurance insuring title, and might be characterized as a hybrid form of
insurance. However it is characterized, this difference is important in this case for several
reasons, discussed at various points below.
For example, the coverage afforded by Endorsement 116 distinguishes this case
from most other title insurance claims litigated across the country, which typically involve
judicial analysis that is premised on some sort of title defect or other problem with title, and the
assessment of the consequences thereof. Indeed, FA TCO has failed to point to a single case that
addresses

a..~)r

title insurance issue in the context of CO\Terage afforded by Endorsement 116 or its

equivalent, one way or the other. BOl's nationwide research has likewise failed to reveal such a
case. Consequently, this case appears to be unique in the annals of appellate jurisprudence, and
the various analyses conducted by other courts in the context of more common title defect issues
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may be of limited assistance. In short, this case presents relatively unique questions of first
impression to this Court for review.
Likewise, as discussed in BOl's opening brief, the broad terms "loss or damage"
are undefined by the Policy, and accordingly, must be given their ordinary meaning as applied by
laymen in daily usage. (Appellant's Brief, p. 22.) As illustrated by the common definitions
outlined in BOI's opening brief, the "ordinary meaning" of these terms is not limited as to kind
or type of "loss" or "damage," and therefore far broader than FATCO often implies or asserts in
its various arguments. Given the fact that Endorsement 116 insures the actual physical condition
of the land rather than mere title to the property, it stands to reason that the kinds and types of
"loss" or "damage" sustained by BOI and therefore potentially recoverable under the coverage
afforded by this Policy may logically differ from those typically allowed in a garden variety title
defect case. Accordingly, these distinctions and others make the grant of coverage afforded by
Endorsement 116 the necessary and "natural starting point" for any analysis in this case, contrary
to FA TCO's assertion.
3.

Contrary to FATCO's assertion, the District Court did not find that

BOPs full credit bid was correctly applied as a "payment" on the secured obligation,

In F ATCO's statement of additional issues presented on appeal, it asserts, as Issue

The District Court did not err in finding that BOPs full credit bid was correctly
applied as a payment on the secured obligation and that it satisfied in full any and all
obligations to BOI with respect to the secured indebtedness. (Emphasis added.)
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(Respondent's Brief, p.4) As discussed in detail below, much, if not most of FATCO' s argument
on appeal is premised on this point, i.e., the notion that BOl's full credit bid should be
characterized as a "payment" on the secured obligation for purposes of analyzing the various
provisions in the Policy at issue.
However, the District COUli made no such finding. Indeed, the Court does not
employ the word "payment" in its analysis at alL (R., Vol. 2, pp. 458-61.)
Instead, as discussed at length in BOl's opening brief, the core finding by the
District Court is its conclusion that BOl's full credit bid at the trustee's sale constituted a
"voluntary satisfaction or release of the insured mortgage," which completely terminated
FATCO's liability under Section 9(c) of the Policy. (R., VoL

p.460.) In arriving at this

conclusion, the District Court essentially adopted the argument FA TCO was advancing at the
time, as the Court itself noted in its decision: "[FATCO] asserts that by reason of the full credit
bid, there is no loss or damage i.e., the mortgage debt was satisfied with the full credit bid." (R.,
Vol. 2, pp. 458-9.) For the reasons discussed in BOl's opening brief, this core conclusion by the
District Court, and FATCO's argument to that effect below, are incorrect, and the Court's
decision must be reversed. (Appellant's Brief, pp. 11-14.)
FATCO's incorrect assertion that the District Court concluded that BOl's full

attempt to recast the District Court's conclusion in terms FATCO views as more favorable to its
position. As such, it merely indicates FATCO's recognition that the District Court's conclusion
is flawed. It is nevertheless irrelevant to this Court's review of the District Court's decision.
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Accordingly, it should be rejected by this Court, as should each of the arguments FATCO
attempts to construct on the foundation of that faulty premise.

4.

FATCO's argument that BOl's full credit bid constituted a

"payment," under Sections 2(c) and 9(b) was neither argued nor decided in the District
Court, and accordingly, should not be considered bv this Court on appeal.
As discussed above, the District Court never concluded in the first instance that
BOI's full credit bid was correctly applied as a "payment" on the on the secured obligation,
contrary to FATCO's assertion.
Nonetheless, FA TCO employs this "payment" rationale to argue for the first time
on appeal that: 1) because the full credit bid constitutes a "payment," the amount of insurance
available under Section 2(c) was reduced to zero by BOI's full credit bid, since Section 2(c)
requires that the amount of insurance be "reduced by the amount of all payments made;" and, 2)
in similar fashion, Section 9(b) also requires that the amount of insurance be reduced by
"payments" made, and therefore pursuant to Section 7(a)(ii) the amount of insurance is also
reduced to zero. (Respondent's Brief, pp. 10-13.)
However, FA TCO did not raise the applicability of either Section 2( c) or Section
9(b) in the District Court, in the manner it now argues on appeal. There is no such argument in

District Court did not address or decide anything with respect to Section 2( c) or Section 9(b) in
its analysis. (R., Vol. 2, pp. 458-61.)
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It is axiomatic that this Court will not consider arguments raised for the first time

on appeal. See, e,g, Duspiva v, Fillmore, 154 Idaho 27,

,293 PJd 651,657 (2013)

(Argument that federal standard applied not considered on appeal when not asserted in briefing
to the district court.). Instead, appellate court review is limited to the evidence, theories and
arguments that were presented below, and appellate courts will not consider new arguments on
appeal. See, e,g, Obenchain v, It,1cAlvain Construction, Inc., 143 Idaho 56,57, 137 P.3d 443,
444 (2006) (Argument that untimely appeal was caused by postal enor not considered when not
raised below.).
BOI respectfully submits that in conformity with this longstanding rule, F ATCO's
new arguments regarding the alleged effect of Sections 2( c) and 9(b), which are raised for the
first time on appeal here, should likewise be disregarded by this Court.

FATCO's attempt to re-characterize BOl's full credit bid as a
"payment" rather than a "satisfaction or release" of the secured obligation, as the District
Court concluded, is a distinction without a difference. Regardless of how it is
characterized, Idaho law does not permit FATCO to employ BOPs full credit bid as a
defense to liability under the Policy,
FATCO next argues that "]i]t is well established that a lender's credit bid at a

policy concerns regarding "the integrity of non-judicial foreclosure sales" would be undermined
if that was not the case. (Respondent' Brief, pp. 13-15.) Based on this premise, FA TCO argues
that it too is entitled to characterize BOI's full credit bid as a "payment" and thereby employ it to
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avoid liability under the Policy, reiterating its position that as a "payment," BOI's full credit bid
reduces the amount of insurance to zero. (Respondent' Brief, p. 18.)
However, F ATCO simply misapprehends the limitation imposed by Idaho law on
the use of a full credit bid to avoid liability. As discussed at length in BOl's opening brief, the
full credit bid rule is a creature of the anti-deficiency provisions contained in statutes governing
non~judicial

foreclosures, which are designed to protect borrowers/grantors on a secured

obligation, not a title insurer like F ATCO. (Appellant's Brief, pp. 14-19) As such, Idaho law
precludes FA TCO from asserting BOI's full credit bid as a defense to liability because it is not a
borrower/grantor on a secured obligation, as the Court of Appeal's decision in Willis v. Realty

Country, Inc., 121 Idaho 312, 316-7, 824 P.2d 887, 891

(App. 1991) (pet. rev. denied, February

28, 1992), and this Court's decision in First Security Bank of Idaho, NA. v. Gaige. 115 Idaho
172, 174, 765 P.2d 683, 685 (1988), collectively hold.
This is so regardless of whether one characterizes the full credit bid as a
"payment, as FATCO now attempts to do, or as a "satisfaction or release" of the secured
obligation, as the District Court did below. Either way, the fact of BOl's full credit bid is simply
not available to FA TCO, and cannot be employed as a defense to liability under the Policy.
The full credit bid rule is a judicially created legal fiction designed to protect

Kolodge v. Boyd, 105 Cal Rptr. 2d 749. 755 (lSI Dist 2001), the court recognized this fact in its
discussion of the rationale behind California's full credit bid rule, noting that it is a legal fiction
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which serves the debtor protection policies behind California's anti-deficiency statute in the
context of a lender/debtor relationship:

Acknowledging the interrelationship between foreclosure and antideficiency statutes
[citation omitted] the Supreme Court designed the full credit bid rule to ensure the
integrity of nonjudicial foreclosure sales insofar as such sales may relate to the
debtor protection policies of the antideficiency statutes. The rule makes a properly
conducted nonjudicial foreclosure sale the dispositive device through which to " 'resolve
the question of value and the question of potential forfeiture through competitive
bidding .... ' " [citation omitted] A lender who enters a full credit bid is deemed to have
irrevocably warranted that the value of the security foreclosed upon was equal to the
outstanding indebtedness and not impaired. [citation omitted] Because the secured
obligation has been totally satisfied, there is no deficiency that can be sued upon. The
effect of the rule is to foreclose claims against the borrower that might be allowed by the
anti deficiency statutes, such as a claim for bad faith waste, if the measure of damages
sought is the amount of the alleged impairment of the lender's security.

It is necessary to keep in mind that the idea that the full credit bid
a
constitutes an admission as to the genuine
of
property-is a legal fiction. As the United States Supreme Court has pointed out,
bids at foreclosure sales often bear little relationship to the fair market value of
security property [citation omitted] [" 'fair market value' presumes market conditions
that, by definition, simply do not obtain in the context of a forced sale."].) While the
fiction serves a useful purpose as between a lender and a borrower, because it is a
useful way in which to enforce the policies reflected in the antideficiency statutes, it
can be very troublesome when applied in other contexts, as this case shows.
(Emphasis Added.)

Kolodge. 105 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 755.
Idaho appellate courts have gone even further and simply adopted a bright line
rule that the protections afforded by Idaho's anti-deficiency statute, and the full credit bid rule
embodied therein, do not extend to anyone except the borrower/grantor on a secured obligation,
as reflected in the decisions in Gaige and Willis. Idaho is not alone in this approach. See,

Glenham v. Palzer, 792 P.2d 551 (Wa. App. 1990)(action by secured creditors against third
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parties who were not obligors under loan agreement relating to foreclosed debt not precluded by
full credit bid)
Moreover, FA TCO' s expressed concern regarding the undermining of "the
integrity of non-judicial foreclosure sales" is ironic in the extreme, as is its repeated insistence
that it has not invoked the protection ofIdaho's anti-deficiency statute in this case. (See, e.g.,
Respondent's Brief, p. 1

By asserting BOl's full credit bid to avoid liability, that is precisely

what it has done, because the full credit bid rule only exists in thc context ofIdaho's antideficiency statute in the first instance.
In addition. none of the cases FA TCO relies on require a different analysis. The
only Idaho case cited, Fed. Home Loan A1ortg. Corp. v. Appel, 143 Idaho 42, 137 P.3d 429
(2006). arose in the context of a lender's action to eject the borrowers/grantors from the secured
property after a trustee's sale, and the discussion regarding credit bids arose in the context of
deciding whether or not a credit bid, as opposed to a cash bid, was permissible pursuant to
Idaho's deed of trust foreclosure statutes. Appel, 143 Idaho at 43-4,137 P.3d at 431-2.
Accordingly, Appel does nothing to disturb the decisions in Gaige and Willis, and consequently,
it provides no support to FA TCO' s position here. Likewise, the other two out of state cases cited
by FATCO, Alliance Mortg. Co. v. Rothwell, 900 P.2d 601 (Cal. 1995) and J..,1&1 Bank, FSB. v.

in Gaige and Willis.
Finally, FA TCO' s attempt to distinguish Gaige and Willis is unpersuasive.
FATCO simply asserts that neither Gaige nor Willis supports the notion that a lender's credit bid
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should not be applied as a "payment" on the secured indebtedness. (Respondent's Brief, p.16)
However as discussed above, the fact ofBOl's full credit bid is simply not available to FATCO
as a defense to liability under Idaho law because it is not a borrower/grantor on a secured
obligation. That is true regardless of whether one characterizes a credit bid as a "payment" or as
a "satisfaction or release" of the secured obligation.

6,

F ATCO's attempt to rebut BOPs position that the District Court

erred in its analysis of Section 7(a)(ii) and its conclusion regarding the time at which BOPs
"loss or damage" first "occurred" is unpersuasive,
In the final section ofFATCO's substantive argument, it attempts to rebut BOI's
position, discussed at length in pages 19-24 of its opening brief, that the District Court erred in
its analysis of Section 7(a)(ii), erred in concluding that the foreclosure sale was the first point in
time that "loss or damage" could "occur," and erred in equating the time that such "loss or
damage" "occurs" with the time that the amount of such losses might ultimately be "determined.
(Appellant's Brief, pp. 19-24, Respondent's Brief, p. 19-24.)
FATCO first responds by asserting that even if one assumes BOI incurred "loss or
damage" as a result of the failure to locate a four-plex on Lot 1, that "supposed loss or damage
was mitigated to zero at the foreclosure sale when the debt secured by the insured deed of trust
,~v~s

paid in full." (Respondent's

Brief~

p. 19-24.)

However, FA TCO' s response only demonstrates its misconception of the District
Court's decision, and BOI's resulting position that the Court erred in concluding that the time of
the foreclosure sale is the first point at which loss or damage "occurred" for purposes of
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determining when to measure the amount of the debt pursuant to Section 7(a)(ii). In other words,
the pertinent question under Section 7(a)(ii) is not whether the loss or damage was subsequently
"mitigated to zero" by Bor s full credit bid at the foreclosure sale, or for that matter, even
whether such "loss or damage" may ultimately be recovered by BOL It is instead the following
question: at what point in time did "loss or damage" "insured against" by Endorsement 116 first
"occur?"
As discussed at length in BOl's opening brief, the factual record before the Court
amply demonstrates that significant "loss or damage," as those terms are commonly defined and
employed in Endorsement 116, which included actual, out-of-pocket expenses, first "occurred"
long before the foreclosure sale, at a time when, for purposes of Section 7( a)(ii), the "unpaid
principal on the indebtedness secured by the insured mortgage ... , together with interest thereon"
was far in excess of $200,000.00. (Appellant's Brief, pp. 22-24.) At a minimum, the factual
record before the Court creates material issues of fact in that regard, which make summary
judgment inappropriate.
Next, FATCO insists that BOl's position "reflects a fundamental
misunderstanding" of the nature of the coverage afforded by a lender's policy, and quotes at
length from a number of cases in other jurisdictions and one treatise, in an apparent attempt to
support its position that only a "loan loss" is insured under a lender's policy of title insurance.
(Respondent's Brief, pp. 19-22.)
However, FATCO fails to support that argument with any reference to the
language contained in this Policy. As discussed both above and below, the "loss or damage"
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insured against by Endorsement 116 is clearly not so limited, to a "loan loss" or otherwise.
Instead, those terms are undefined by the Policy, and accordingly must be given their ordinary
meaning as applied by laymen in daily usage, for purposes of analyzing Endorsement 116 and
Section 7(a)(ii).
Moreover, several of the authorities FA TeO relies on do not actually supp0l1
FATeO' s position, and all are readily distinguishable from this case. In the first instance, none
involve a lender's policy which includes a grant of coverage like that afforded to BOI by
Endorsement 116, or its equivalent. As discussed above, the coverage afforded by Endorsement
116 differs markedly from "garden variety" title insurance, which typically only insures against

defects in title and the like, while Endorsement 116 insures the actual physical condition of the
land. Likewise, no case addresses the nature of "loss or damage" as those terms are commonly
defined for purposes of Endorsement 116 and Section 7(a)(ii), and none interprets the meaning
and etTect of either provision.
The authorities cited by FATeo are summarized in its quote from Palomar's
Treatise, which FA TeO emphasizes as follows:
[I]n the context of an owner's policy, the insured sustains a "loss" when the
existence of a title problem reduces the fair market value of the insured
interest; conversely, in the context of a loan polkv, the insured generally has
no compensable "loss," despite the existence of a title problem, unless the loan
is not repaid and, as a result of the title problem, the lender receives less for the
land than the amount of the debt. In other words, existing case law almost
unanimously holds that an insured owner has a loss as soon as its legal rights
in the property are diminished, without an out-of-pocket cost; but a lender has
no loss until it sustains an out-of-pocket loss. This distinction is expressly
made in the cases of Green v. Evesham Corp., Blackhawk Production Credit
Ass'n v. Chicago Title Ins. Co., CMEI, Inc. v. American Title Ins. Co.
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Joyce Palomar, Title Ins. Law § 6:20 (2011) (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
(Respondent's Brief, pp. 21-2.)
The quoted language that FA TCO emphasizes makes clear that Palomar is
addressing traditional title insurance that only insures title, not the coverage afforded to BOI in
this case by Endorsement 116. More importantly, the emphasized language actually supports
BOrs position, not FATCO's. It is clearly addressing the question of whether an insured lender
has suffered a loss that is "compensable" under a lender's policy, not the pertinent question here,
\vhich is the time at which "loss or damage" has "occurred" for purposes of Section 7(a)(ii) and
Endorsement 116. Finally, it confirms that a lender suffers a "loss" when it sustains out-ofpocket loss. As discussed above, the record in this case clearly demonstrates the BOI sustained
out-of-pocket losses long before the foreclosure sale. In short, nothing in the quote from Palomar
or the other cases cited by FA TCO refutes BOl's position.
~ext,

based on the authorities it cites, FATCO argues that there are two

indispensable prerequisites to "recovery" under a lender's title policy: 1) the existence of an
"insured defect;" and, 2) a "loan loss" resulting from the "insured defect." It asserts that if either
prerequisite is missing, there is no "loss" or "damage" within the "indemnity" of the policy.
(Respondent's Brief, pp. 22-23.) It concludes by asserting that none of the issues discussed in
BOI's opening brief, such as a diminution in value of the collateral, the inability to market the

insured deed of trust on the secondary market, a default by the borrowers, or the necessity of
foreclosure "are defects insured under the Loan Policy." (Respondent's Brief, p. 23.)
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However, none of the language quoted by FA TCO from the authorities it cites
states that a "loan loss" is required, or even addresses the meaning of that term. Moreover, as
discussed both above and below, the question of whether or not a "recovery" may be had is
simply irrelevant to the question at hand.
More importantly, FATCO's discussion reflects its apparent confusion as to the
distinction between the risk insured against, the "defect" in FA TCO' s parlance, and a "loss"
caused by that "defect." There is no dispute that the "defect" insured against in this case is the
risk that a building was not physically located on Lot 1. As discussed above, the grant of
coverage afforded to BOl by Endorsement 116 unambiguously and unequivocally "insures" BOl
for all "loss or damage" which it "shall sustain" because a "multi family residence" was not
"located on the land," and there is no dispute that there was no building on the insured parcel.
As also discussed above and in BOl's opening brief, the broad terms "loss or
damage" are undefined by the Policy, and accordingly, they must be given their ordinary meaning
as applied by laymen in daily usage. See, e.g. Armstrong v. Farmers Ins. Co. of Idaho, 147 Idaho
67, 71,205 P.3d 1203, 1207 (2009). As illustrated by the common definitions outlined in BOl's
opening brief, the "ordinary meaning" of these terms is not limited in terms of the kind or type.
Consequently, the "loss" or "damage" is not limited to a "loan loss" under the coverage afforded
by Endorsement 116,

COl1tral)T

to Fi\. Teo' s

rel)C~:ted

assertion.

Moreover, no other provision of the Policy at issue here limits the terms "loss or
damage" to a "loan loss" as FATCO suggests. The sole constraint on the "loss or damage" that is
recoverable under the Policy is contained in the first sentence of Section 7, which provides:
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This policy is a contract of indemnity against actual monetary loss or damage
sustained or incurred by the insured claimant who has suffered loss or damage by
reason of the matters insured against by this policy and only to the extent herein
described. (Emphasis added.)

CR. Vol. 2, p. 455.)
This provision says nothing about the term "loss or damage" being limited to a
"loan loss." Moreover, it draws the clear distinction between the generic manner in which the
term "loss or damage" is employed in Endorsement 116 and Section 7(a)(ii), and the type of
"loss or damage" that is ultimately recoverable under the Policy, i.e., "actual monetary loss or
damage.

In other words, the provision explicitly recognizes that an "insured claimant" may

suffer generic "loss or damage" as a result of "matters insured against" by the Policy for purposes
of Endorsement 116 and Section 7(a)(ii), but that such generic "loss or damage" may only be
recoverable to the extent it constitutes "actual monetary loss or damage."
Consequently, this provision only provides further support for BOl's position that
the record before the Court amply demonstrates that it sustained "loss or damage" for purposes of
Endorsement 116 and Section 7(a)(ii) long before the foreclosure sale took place, contrary to
FA TCO' s arguments and the District Court's decision.
Finally, F ATCO argues that whatever losses "Bor supposedly incurred" prior to
the foreclosure sale, they were "mitigated in full" at the foreclosure sale by its full credit bid.
(Respondent's Brief, pp. 22-23.)
However, this argument again illustrates FA TCO' s misconception of the District
Court's decision, and BOl's position that the Court erred in its analysis with respect to when
"loss or damage" first "occurred" for purposes of Section 7(a)(ii). As discussed above, the
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pertinent question under Section 7(a)(ii) is not whether the loss or damage was subsequently
"mitigated in full" by BOl's full credit bid, but instead when did "loss or damage" "insured
against" by Endorsement 116 first "occur?"
In short, none of FA TCO' s arguments in support of the District Court's decision
regarding Section 7(a)(ii) and the time at which BOI's "loss or damage" first "occurred" are
persuasive, the District Court's decision in that regard is incorrect, and it should accordingly be
reversed for the reasons discussed above and in BOl's opening brief.

7.

BOPs appeal is not frivolous, unreasonable or without foundation,

and accordingly, FATCO is not entitled to an award of attorney's fees on appeal,
FA TCO asserts that it is entitled to an award of attorney's fees and costs on appeal
pursuant to Idaho Code § 12-123, Idaho Code § 41-1839(4) and lv10rtensen v. Stewart Title Guar.

Co., 149 Idaho 437, 447, 235 P.3d 387,397 (2010). It contends it is entitled to such an award
because BOl's appeal is frivolous, unreasonable and without foundation. It bases that contention
on the argument that BOI has not introduced any arguments or cited any authority not already
considered and disposed of by the District Court, and therefore, BOI is only asking this Court to
reach a different conclusion. (Respondent's Brief, pp. 24-25.)
Nothing could be further from the truth. In lHortensen. this Court upheld the trial

Idaho Code §§ 41-1839 and 12-123 are the exclusive remedies for obtaining attorney
fees in disputes arising out of insurance policies. I.C. § 41-1839(4). The district court
awarded $25,000 in attorney fees to Stewart Title pursuant to § 41-1839(4), which
permits such an award in suits over insurance policies when the court finds "that a case
was brought, pursued or defended frivolously, unreasonably or without foundation."
Although § 41-1839 does not clarify what cases would be unreasonable or frivolous, this
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Court has many times addressed I.e. § 12-121, a similar provision that permits fee
awards in frivolous or meritless cases. Under I.C. § 12-121, "[i]fthere is a legitimate,
triable issue of fact or a legitimate issue of law, attorney fees may not be awarded."
Kieber! v. Goss, 144 Idaho 225, 228,159 P.3d 862,865 (2007). "[W]hether a statute
awarding attorney's fees applies to a given set of facts is a question oflaw" subject to free
review. Ransom v, Topaz Mktg, 143 Idaho 641, 644,152 P.3d 2,5 (2006).
The district court's award was proper because Mortensen never raised any triable
issues of fact. Mortensen raised an emotional-distress claim and a claim for breach
of contract for Stewart Title's refusal to defend his appeal in the face of
contract language permitting
to
limit on his
policy instead of pursuing his appeal. Mortensen also did not attempt to offer any
factual evidence to support his claims that Stewart Title acted without diligence or
bad faith when it sought to obtain for him an ownership interest in the access
road, even though he demanded that Stewart Title do something to ensure he had an
easement there. The award for attorney fees below pursuant to I.e. § 41-1839(4) is
therefore affirmed. (Emphasis added.)
Mortensen, 149 Idaho at 447,235 P.3d at 397. Upon further review, this Court also decided to

award fees on appeal for the same reasons, despite the fact that the respondent's request for fees
on appeal was not ideal:
As stated above, I.e. § 41-1839(4) authorizes an award of attorney fees ifan appeal is
brought frivolously. Again, Mortensen is merely asking this Court to second-guess the
district court's ruling despite unambiguous controlling language in the insurance policy.
After reviewing the briefing on the petition for rehearing, the Court awards attorney fees
on appeal in this substitute opinion. See Elec, Wholesale Supply Co, v, Nielson, 136 Idaho
814,828,41 P.3d 242, 256 (2001) (awarding fees where the appellant "failed to
present a meaningful issue on a question of law"). Therefore, no rehearing is
necessary. Stewart Title's petition for rehearing is denied. (Emphasis added.)
Mortensen, 149 Idaho at 448,235 P.3d at 398.

Unlike the appellant in 1'v1ortensen, BOI presents perfectly legitimate and
important questions of law to this Court regarding the proper interpretation and effect of the
Policy language at issue which are questions of first impression for this Court. It also presents a
perfectly legitimate question of whether FA TCO can employ the full credit bid rule to avoid
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liability, given existing Idaho law which holds that it cannot. Likewise, BOI has presented
genuine issues of fact regarding the nature, extent and timing of "loss" or "damage" it has
sustained, as the District Court itself acknowledged, though it found those genuine issues to be
immaterial in light of its legal conclusions. (R. Vol. 2, p. 461)
The mere fact that the District Court incorrectly rejected BOl's arguments does
not render them frivolous, unreasonable or without foundation. Indeed, if that was the case, one
could never appeal an adverse summary judgment determination without fearing an award of fees
on appeal. Accordingly, an award of fees to F ATCO is clearly improper, regardless of the
outcome of this appeal.

CONCLUSION
For each of the foregoing reasons, and for the reasons discussed in its opening
brief, BOI respectfully requests that this Court reverse the District Court's decision, and remand
this action to the District Court for further proceedings consistent with the Court's decision.
DATED this 21 st day of November, 2013.
HOPKINS RODEN CROCKETT
HANSEN & HOOPES, PLLC
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